Ahok Case 2017 has turned out to be vantage point for rethinking the intricacy between multiculturalism and practice of political representation in Post New Order Indonesia. It discloses central problem of Indonesian democracy, that is, how Islam should be politically articulated in nation-wide project of reinventing democratic citizenship. Reflecting upon variety of both public and academic narratives on the case, this paper argues that centrality of religious articulation around the event takes place in the backdrop of fundamental crisis in the practice of political representation since the early years of democratization. The case shows how religious identity becomes determining signifier that defines Pro-Ahok and Anti-Ahok in terms of electorate and social movements. Venturing beyond two seemingly contradictory approaches, ‘politicization of Islam’ and ‘Islamization of politics’, this paper further argues that the case draws our sustained attention to rethinking religious articulation of citizenship which encourages pluralist democracy with grounded agenda for economic justice and political equality in multicultural Indonesia.
Keywords: Ahok, Islam, citizenship, Ummah, signifier, democracy
Introduction: Setting the Context
Ahok, nickname for Basuki Cahaya Purnama, is more than a name of indiviudal citizen or governor. Electoral politics in the Capital of early 2017 has transformed this person into historical figure around which multiple articulation of cultural identity, public opinion, elite reconsolidation have been shaped and constested. For those whose concern is multiculturalism this name tells stories about tolerance and intolerance, while for those concerned with political representation, Ahok helps highlight problems and challenges for enhancing pluralist citizenship and requestioning constitutional practice. It also sheds new lights on the long held question of whether Islam is compatible or incompatible with democracy. For the rest of broader public this figure sets out defining marker between friend and enemy, through which to march a rally of hostile slogan, ‘you are with us or with the enemy’.
Adding to his lost in governor election 9 May 2014 and being sentenced for 2 years in prison without probation relating the alleged blasphemy, the historical significance of this figure increases dramatically as to further questioning the relation between religion and politics, or specifically Islam dan democracy, identity politics in the practice of political representation as well as lesson learnt for further discussion on the quality of Indonesian democracy. It is like the opening of pandora box, or trojan horse, out of which multiple narratives on the darks sides of Indonesian experience with democracy are overtly unveiled and fiercely debated either in public talk or among disparate cliches of divided intellectuals and activists. Instead of being dying figure, his case seems to bring together almost all aspects in our one decade and half of Islam-democracy debate against the backdrop of the threatening rise of ‘far-right’ populism in many regions of the world today.
Our concern with the case is largely on the question of how it can assists us in interrogating more deeply the conflunce between multiculturalism and political representation practice in contemporary Indonesia, intricacy between practice of civil rights in public sphere or civil sociey and the practice of constructing citizenship or representing ‘people’ in electoral politics of political society. Precisely with this general interrogation, our attention is focused on the political function of the religion in such relationship. Venturing beyond the primacy of ideology (Islamization of Politics) and primacy of politics (Politicization of Islam), we analyses different path and function Islam takes in constructing the ‘people’ as illustrated in historical case of Ahok. To meet this purpose, our analysis highlights crises in political representation and links them into Islamic articulation or construction of people or Ummah in electoral practice. This is accomplished by conceptually distinguishing multiculturalism as an act of civil society from political representation as an act of electoral democracy.
Since early years of political liberalization, Islam has been the most debated topic in multifront of democracy talks. It characterizes three fronts in relation to the state—Islam nation-state, to secularism—civil Islam, and to supra-state or transnationalism—Islam Khilafah (Syaukanie , 2011). The first refers to Islamic political party such as PAN, PKB, PPP and especially the rise and influence of PKS, the second refers to Muhammadiyah, Nadhatul Ulama (NU) and especially FPI and other Islamic related Ormas (social-cultural organization) perceived as violently intolerant, and the third refers to Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and especially JAT which perceived as part of global-regional terrorist networks. Islamic articualtion in the three fronts mostly defined as political, meaning it seeks to create certain Islamic influence in constitutional state, public ordering, and global-regional governance (Barton, 2005; Bruinessen, 2002, Heffner 2002; Wahid, 2009). There is general pattern of teoretical treatment by using liberal parameters of evaluation such as rule of law and freedom of expression, that can easily confine the islamic articulations into violence perpetrator, intolerance, anti-democracy, anti-Pancasila and allegedly in constrast to ‘uniqueness’ of Indonesian culture. This also applies to a number of study that arguing for the problems and challenges ensuing from the formalization of Islamic influence in the state through Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) whose religous decree (Fatwa) preaches intolerance, discrimination and minoritization (Ismail 2008; Ichwan 2005, Heffner, 2017).
Different stream of study focusing on Islamic articulation in political society offers fresh impetus for rehistorizing and recontextualising Islam within discourse of substantial democracy. Its focus is on the question of Islamic ideologies, interpretations and practices that directly engage with central issue of citizenship such as national representation of leadership from various cultural background, access to economic resource and opportunity, and collective struggle to symbolise the nation or define nationalism in identitarian terms (Liddle, 1996; Porter, 2002; Baswedan, 2004; Hadiz, 2010). Islam has been integral to Indonesian nation-state building and its development throughout national political history. Its rise since late years of New Order marks rather new chapter in the country’s effort to enhance political engagament of broad based population into political parties, organizations and movements associated with the state or policy making.
However, poor perfomance of Islamic parties indicated in rapacious-corrupt behaviour of their elite and internal conflicts of organizational leadership sets breeding ground for the rise of Islamic populism or social movement based articulation as indicated by the rise of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera similar at certain extent to AKP in Turkey and Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt (Hadiz, 2014, 2016; Machmudi, 2008). Despite of the varying degree of geopolitical influence and pressure, Islamic populism in Indonesia relates to capitalist development that creates broad segment of discontent working class in desperate need of secure jobs and cultural recognition in the setting of neoliberal globalization. This is also applied to comparative experience between Indonesia and neighbor country Malaysia where different historical, economic and sociological problems and challenges pose divergent trajectory of state policies in the contending creation of Ummah as integral process of constructing ‘other’ (non-moslem and illegitimate moslem) including its far reaching influence on majority-minority relation based on mixture of religion and race (Sofyan 2016, 2016; Hadiz, 2002; Hamayotsu, 2002) .
The discussion above sets the context of our discussion on the significance of Islam toward which Pro-Ahok and Anti-Ahok strands sought to articulate and define citizenship, its constitutive feature including type of leadership and its governance. Central message of the studies mentioned is that there have been two accompying trends and processes that characterize political islamism in contemporary electoral democracy, that is, on the one hand, the increase and more deeply rooted Islamic populism with popular stronghold in multiculturalism or civil society while on the other hand, the rapid decrease of popular distrust to political representation through political parties including in this case Islamic political parties. It requires persistence in not being deluded by symptomatic of this discrepancy such as the notion of ‘democracy’ versus ‘anti-democracy’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ versus ‘liberal triumphalism’, ‘tolerance’ versus ‘intolerance’, or even the notion of ‘majority’ versus ‘minority’ and ‘native’ and ‘non-native’. Instead of rejecting the binary, we are rethinking the function of religion through them, their context of usage and their claims to be stable, non-political naming of self and other. Before exploring analysing
the case and concluding with our main arguments, we briefly outline our problematization of multiculturalism and the crisis of political hegemony that altogether facilitate the intrusion of religion as determining signifier for contending parties as response to the crisis of democratic construction of people or Ummah—citizenship. While succeding session discusses variety of narrative constitutive of Ahok Case, symptomatic of root cause that lies in the crisis.
Conceptualising Islam as Political Signifier
As many other forms of ideology, Islam has been articulated by various actors and movements. Throughtout moslem countries in Southeast Asia and Middle East, it is fiercely contested, creates deep division, often violent, between various factions in regional political spectrum. Post Cold War period, particularly post 9/11, bears witness to the increasing influence of Islam in matters of nation-state and global-regional order. Its multiple articulation discloses how it is not politically fixated, being taken over and replaced by different interpretations and actions with divergent temporal and spatial implication. Islam has many faces when it is within political arena and its articualtion reflects both political-economic and cultural setttings and challenges ((Ayoob, 2008, 2005). It goes beyond ideology talk and directly touches upon matters of governing public demands, institutions and resources.
Drawn upon Discourse Analysis Approach, the multiple articulation of Islam explains the central function of religion in democratic politics. Islamism is multiple movements as response to colonial and postcolonial order of the nation state and global governance. It relates directly to economic inequality of capitalist development, authoritarian practice of secular government, neoliberalism of global forces. The approach sees Islamism not as mere tools or instrument hijjaked for certain political purpose but unveils its nature as political signifier of certain discourse (Sayyid, 1997, 2014). Democracy cannot contain Islam because democracy itself is a horizon of freedom and equality into which their multiple articulation is made possible (Laclau, 1994, 2005, Isin, 2002). Like communism and other ideological articulations, Islam defines the people or demos—citizenship—in certain political order regardless of who or what force carries out such task. As political signifier, it is not equally similar among moslem countries. Islamic populism in Turkey, for instance, shares different traits of popular articulation with Islamic populism in Egypt, Iran, Indonesia and countries of North and Central Africa. By defining what is liberty and equality Islam altogether is defining the Ummah as well as the other as non-Ummah. This is inherent in the concrete articulation of all political ideologies.
With this in mind, the question of citizenship needs to be addressed. Construction of Ummah is construction of certain type of citizenship. In democratic practice, Islamic articulation of what and how citizenship should be doing and constructed is legitimate act as this articulation competes with versions of citizenship proposed by other contending ideological forces. Among Islamic forces there are multiple, often contradictory, articulations of citizenship that prioritise divergent concept and practice of liberty and equality. Against the backdrop of current neoliberal dominance, Islamism with its multiple articulation emerges to contest dominant narrative and practice of citizenship. In the very act of constructing of Ummah, Islamism is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, meaning it seeks to represent broad spectrum of moslem population regardless of class, ethnic and territorial enclaves while excluding those who are not falling into its categorization of Ummah. This is agonistic dimenstion of Islamism in democratic polity in so far it still recognizes other to exist and have equal opportunity in political struggle for power and social ordering (Mouffe, 2000, 2005).
What is at stake is the extent to which islamism remains agonistic in its struggle for political hegemony. Current experience of Islamism around the world shows at least two most apparent faces of islamism, first is reactive and second is pro-active. Reactive in the sense that Islamism seeks not to hegemonise but to be totalitarian ideology and practice that exlude and eliminate the non-Ummah in its construction of political community. This trend seems increasingly appealing for those economically excluded or deprived of their cultural autonomy and recognition in neoliberal globalization. Some scholars remind us that this trend is unintended consequence of multicultural arrangement ensuing by neoliberal forces to contain Islam into cultural domain, recognising and supporting its cultural practice but seeking at all cost to prevent the intrusion of political Islam into state and policy making arena. The rise of reactive Islamism in form of terrorist and extremist groups is then seen as backlash to the neoliberal policy campaign (Sen, 2006; Brown, 2006). Other scholar, Zizek argues that neoliberal containment of post Cold War Islam deliberately focuses on ‘subjective’ violence of reactive Islamism and distracts global public attention from scrutinizing ‘objective’ or structural violence sistematically commited by neoliberal policies in Moslem countries of Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia (Zizek, 2008). While another scholar, Paulina Tambakaki, theorizes reactive Islamism as results of the politically unresolved tension between human rights-based practice of citizenship and real politics of democratic citizenship (Tambakaki, 2010). Reactive Islamism considered as response to rights-assuming politics of neoliberal citizenship which preserves the power of minoritarian elite and depolitizes large masses of lower class population under the banner of multiculturalism.
On the other hand, pro-active Islamism refers to agonistic articulation of Islamism that seeks to construct Ummah as its political project without eliminating others. The objective of Pro-active Islamism is to hegemonize, not to dominate other forces. Discourse analysis approach reminds us that the tension between reactive and pro-active remains there in Islamic struggle for constructing citizenship and nation-state. It is precisely in understanding such tension that we reflect on Ahok Case to make more sense of the function of Islam as political signifier. As we argue in succeding sessions, centrality of Islam as signifier applies to those contending forces, Pro-Ahok and Anti-Ahok, as evolved among political elites, polictial parties, electorate, mass media, netizens and broader public of the nation. Conceptual insights of Discourse Analysis mentioned above are very fruitful to illuminate the increasing significance of religion in Indonesian politics today. The use of the approach is not to determine reactive or pro-active Islamism in the case but to draw our attention to the crisis of democratic citizenship in post New Order, absence of Islamic hegemony in constructing political community, and opportunity to redirect religion into national politics within agonistic framework.
Ahok in Six Narratives: Many Faces of ‘Islam’
The first task to understand the centrality of Islam is to deconstruct the case, meaning finding out and highlighting narratives that constitute Ahok case. It is interesting that all narratives under study actually engage organizational and substantial issues of political representation. Organizational issue covers contestation among political leadership at national level, political parties of either Islamic, national, or in-between strands, and influence of military in national politics. While substantial issue includes rule of laws regarding blasphemy, tolerance, political equality, economic injustice, and the race and political identity, and construction of national enemy such as the return of communism, lurking dangers of the rising China and the growing penetration of radical Islam into state arena. Both organizational and substantial issues are indexes of deeper problems of defining liberty and equality as to construct what is Indonesian citizenship. what is presented below is summaring version of the narratives. The point is to show how the relation between Islam and citizenship is separately articulated in the narratives of Ahok case.
First narrative is blasphemy, or legal narrative. This is the triggering issue that escalates other issues. Ahok was convicted of commiting blasphemy when he cited Al Maidah 51 in his official speech to the people in Seribu Islands in 2016. Against the background of the fierce contestation of Capital’ s governor, his brief statement on the article escalates broader public concern and starts to be marking point in the overall course of election and post election politics. This is apparently a technical-legal issue but in the process this legal aspect of the issue is instead being trojan horse for other related issues such the involvement of MUI by officially declaring the statement as blasphemy, the creation of Gerakan National Pengawal Fatwa MUI (GNPF MUI) led by Front Pembela Islam (FPI), and impartiality of law enforcement endorsed by conflicting groups. This issue also escalates fragmentation and reconsolidation among political parties and sets grounds for more divisive polarization among NU, Muhammadiyah and other Islamic movements. Another aspect worth noting is the growing reconsolidation of Christian and other non-moslem factions with NU and other ‘nationalist-secular’ moslem factions constituting Pro-Ahok movement against the rest.
Second narrative is elite-capture, or political-economy narrative. The escalation of blasphemy narrative into broader national public considered as systematic attempt by national opposition parties to undermine current political establishment. Ahok is integral to the establishment, closely related to the president, Jokowi and supreme leader of Partai National Demokrasi-Indonesia (PDIP), Megawati Sukarnoputri. There is widely held perception that who wins the election would determine presidential election in 2019, assuming that political power of Jakarta’ provincial government with largest electorate base in the country would affect future presidential election. This narrative has been popular among political scientists, partisan journalists/mass media, and those actively engaged in organizations/movements related to political parties or those whose livelihood would be deeply affected by the election. This narrative has strong resonance in political science which looks at the case as the most apparent catharsis of political deadlock among conflicting segments of national oligarchy (see, Robison & Hadiz, 2004). The point is that both sides make use of Ahok as proxy to test their own political eligibility and popularity as well as to reorganize control over population, resources, and developmental policy (Fuller, 2017). However, this narrative also being contested given the fact that though ‘Anies-Andi’ wins the election their future government will be seriously hindered by central governemt policy of budget allocation and sectoral-ministrial regulations (Ambardi, 2017). National oligarchy of both parties has similar interest with the increasing containment of Ahok case into religious contestation highly useful for their calculated electoral gains.
Third narrative is politics of the urban poor, or Islamic populism narrative. Strong support of Jakarta’s working class is perceived as response to Ahok and Jokowi’s developmental policies which prioritize efficiency and accountabilty in contrast with the livelihood of most of the urban poor that based on bureucratic clientelism, institutionalized patronage in distributing state’s resources. Issue of blasphemy is perceived as incarnation of Ahok’s arrogance and abuse of power in both developmental policy and multicultural sensitivity. The massive mobilization and participation of the urban poor in series of rallyng march, including the notorious ‘212 movement’, indicate how working class is ‘islamised’as their demanding rhetorics stretching from the call for Islamic governor and economic justice for majoritarian moslem. This narrative is also confirmed by a number of study showing the rapid ‘islamization’ of the urban working class led by islamic popular leaders whose material economic bases of their power in Jakarta’s sub-urban villages are in decay including in this case Habib Rizieq and his fellow arabian descended ulamas (Eve Warburton. 2016, PWD Research Report 2017). The extent to which this movement falls strictly into category of populism remains debated but building on insights from comparative studies of Islamic populism, the inclusion of this ‘precarious class’ into Islamic articulation is worthy of our sustained attention (Hadiz, 2016, Yasih, 2017).
Fourth narrative is racialization of Indonesian identity, or political identity narrative. Ahok case resurfaces old question about popular recognition of Chinese Indonesian as national citizen. His racial background as Chinese is employed as indicative of not only economic but also political dominance of the chinese ‘race’ in Indonesian political economy structure since the late years of Dutch’s colonial era. Chinese Indonesian as ‘bastard children of the country’ or as ‘traitor’ who serves the rising China power has been the dominant rhetoric found in public conversation and social media. This issue closely connected to the third narrative in which Ahok’s alleged blasphemy reveals Indonesian chinese’s true nature as they are culturally distinguishable from most of the indonesian cultures. Indonesian chinese is perceived as ‘non-native’ even though their ancestors had been in Nusantara since twelveth centurty of pre-colonialism (Evi Maharani. 2017). This racialization of Indonesian identity in which being Chinese is antagonistic to construct native Indonesian has been entertained by both political elites and broader segment of working class to meet their divergent purposes. Ahok case becomes lense available in place to talk about development injustice producing poverty and exclusion as well as scapegoat in struggle for political power among conflicting segments of national oligarchy.
Fifth narrative is Islamization of politial leadership, or political identity narrative. This narrative is conceptually similar to the fourth narrative but with far reaching implication for national integration. Our study shows the development of two contrasting perceptions on the issue of political leadership in multicultural Indonesia with moslem majoritarian population. On one hand, Anti-Ahok movement raises question of the cultural legitimacy of political leadership of non-Christian in Jakarta province with moslem majority, while on the other hand, non-moslems particularly Christians in Pro-Ahok movement argue for political equality before the national constitution regardless of race and religion, ‘majority’ or ‘minority’. Among moslem scholars and broader public, their internal debate has been so fierce that two dominant Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, are in protracted war of ideological rhetoric between ‘Islam Nusantara’ (NU) recognising difference and multicultural equality and ‘Islam Kemajuan’ (Muhammadiyah) recognising multicultural difference but not in matters of political leadership such as president of the country or governor in moslem populated province.
During election period there have been series of conflicts among grassroot islamic movements particularly between those affiliated with NU and those affiliated with Anti-Ahok movement but allegedly connected to ‘Arabian wahhabism’. This internal contestation is also evident in constrasting view between MUI leadership and NU leadership supported by ‘nationalist moslem’ leadership particularly those belong to political parties supporting Ahok-Jarot such as PDIP, NU-affiliated PKB and Nasdem. Moreover, this narrative triggers response from non-moslem, particularly Christians, in Kalimantan and other christian populated provinces such as Papua, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), Maluku, North Maluku, North Sulawesi, including Hindunese Bali. Most of the response revolves around the issue of ‘islamization’ of Indonesian politics, political inequality toward non-moslem, the rise of ‘radical’ Islam into national political spectrum such as FPI and Hisbut Tahrir. There has been in their rhetorics the call for separation from ‘Javanese-moslem’ occupied Indonesia, recalling communal-religious conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku, and lesson learnt from Timorese struggle for independence from ‘Islamic turned Suharto’ in the late years of New Order.
Sixth narrative is the return of Communism, or ideological narrative. Issue of communism returning into Indonesian politics is apparently strange but actually has deep connection with second, third and fourth narratives. This is rhetoric of both highest rank of Indonesian military and leading ulamas of anti-Ahok movement. In contrast to the fear of rising islamization, Ahok case provides opportunity for military leaders to set their stake in the case by officially reminding the public to be alert to the hidden agenda of ‘old communism’ of PKI combined with current agenda of rising power of communist China in the north. While simultenously since post first round election this rhetoric is calibrated in variety of religious public gatherings by leading ulama particularly those affiliated with GNPF MUI such as the notorious Bachtiar Natsir. Central message of this narrative is to escalate anti-Ahok sentiments that he is undercover communist working for China’s communist government to revive communist ideology in Indonesia and to control economic resources of the country in the service of China’s geopolitical expansion. In this sense, Ahok is serious threat to ‘Pancasila’ and national sovereignty. To escalate the threat, issue of planned military coup and ‘Makar’ exposed to broader public as indicated in the virality of Alan Nairn’s in-depth report and the arrest of several Anti-Ahok’s leading figure of ‘secularist’ background (see Alan Nairn, 2017). In our brief analysis, this narrative serves different purposes of those actors. Ahok case is trojan horse for the military establishment as they are in desperate struggle to distract public attention from public debate on the 1965 genocide that has been taking place in the last three years. While for the leading proponents of Anti-Ahok movement this rhetoric is first to show their siding with the military on the issue of genocide given the fact that Islamic groups were major players in the act. Second objective is to counter the Pro-Ahok rhetoric of islamization threat in national politics.
Locating Islam: Its centrality in the Absence of democratic Citizenship
The six narratives that coalesce around Ahok case reveal the deep crisis in the quality of Indonesian democracy. Enganging closely with the narratives, our analysis finds out that in electoral practice ‘the people’ or ‘Ummah’is constructed by variety of public discourse with less attention given to how justice and equality can be articulated in grounded fashion such as through relatively clear-cut class politics or cross-class alliance articulation. Looking more closely at electoral process, first and second round election, ‘Islamic populism’ supposedly represented by Anti-Ahok movement does not have historical precedent in pre-election period nor having future political trajectory in post election period. While ‘liberal-tolerant politics’ supposedly represented by Pro-Ahok movement is different side of the antagonistic coin, pretending to be recognising political difference but in fact playing out fiercely exclusionary logic of doing politics. Zero-zum game characterises the election that finally proves how contending movements depend entirely on the result of the election to define who and whose issues are legitimate.
Electoral democracy is not merely about selecting governmental office holders but more importantly about productive moment of constructing citizenship with far-reaching implication on the making of relatively coherent political community. Two years of the electoral process, in contrast, escalate conflict among elite and worsen multicultural fragmentation and enmity in public sphere or civil society. Multiculturalism has shown its real face as depolitizing ideology in ‘non-political’ moment of pre and post election while hiding underneath economic and political contradictions which then explode in ‘political’ moment of election (Duile & Bens, 2017). While political parties tasked with ‘aggregating’ and ‘representing’ the people, or in our approach, constructing citizenship, keep bussied themselves with power sharing and power constestation with lack of regular contact with sectoral or cross-class constituence. Consequently, electoral regime becomes crucial for contending elites to carry out massive mobilization of popular bases and perform brief but intensive engangement with sensitive issues that incite anger, fear and anxiety among depoliticized voters. In this case, friction among Islamic parties worsens the crisis that then escalates the ‘conservative-Islamic turn’ in Indonesian politics. Absence of hegemonic or relatively coherent Islamic political agenda has given another crucial dimension to this electoral collision. Ahok case shows different kind of ‘conservative’ turn compared to political Islam in the late period of New Order and early years of Reform.
Ahok case in another fashion reveals the collision between two seemingly separate trends in post New Order, namely, first, grounded multicultural campaign in producing and strenghening ‘civil society’ or public sphere and second, decreasing role of political parties to represent broad spectrum of population into ideological grammars such as class or sectoral-territorial based articulation. What is then evident in electoral politics is that multicultural bases of popular movement provides electoral constituence for the oligarchy of political parties including Islamic parties. As indicated in the election process where all candidates including ‘Ahok-Jarot’ employing religious tactics and religious gathering as political space and moment. In the first round of election ‘Ahok-Jarot’ kept focused on their rhetorics of ‘technocratic populism’ such as bureaucratic efficiency-accountability and urban development for urban poor, and this rhetoric proved to win him in the first round. In the second round, along with the escalation of those six narrative their rhetoric and tactics shifted into ‘Islamic populism’ as propagated by ‘Anies-Andi’. The most illustrative is his nickname changed into Basuki to be sound more ‘Indonesian-Javanese’ while his vice governor publicly announced as the most pious among other moslem candidates because he has conducted hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, not to mention their regular visit and campaign in religious gatherings or public gathering with Islamic ambience.
Drawing on abundant data and information on the electoral process, our study summarizes four analytical insights to argue about the centrality of Islam or religion in the electoral process against the backdrop of crisis in political representation. First, Ahok case discloses the significance of religion, in this case Islam, as political signifier to mobilise potential voters or constituence. This constituence belongs sociologically to variety of islamic ‘social movement’, or belonging to multiculturalism trend of post Reform civil society. We understand this temporary shift of cultural identity into electoral constituence as electoral Ummah given the fact that after election they are not present in governmental policy making and relatively absent in post-election politial discourse. In post election period they will be neutralized or reconfined into multicultural discourses of harmonious and tolerant Islam. In short, they experience double depolitization in both election and post-election environment. They fall prey to electoral predators of national oligarchy from both Pro-Ahok and Anti-Ahok movement.
Second, the electoral Ummah reflects deep crisis in political costruction of democratic citizenship and political community. Democratic project of constructing citizenship requires broader antagonism beyond cultural difference, meaning any political project must construct ‘common enemy’ to be able to include broad segments of population. Instead of going beyond or uniting cultural difference, talkingpoint of the election is ‘Islam’ with its divisive propensity rather Islam with its cohesive articulation. In this election, Islam divides political contenders in broadening spectrum of issues as indicated in the six narratives. In contrast to Islamic populism in Turkey, for instance, variety of islamic articulations in this electoral case has no broad and coherent political agenda to be hegemonic in long termed framework. Beside lacking geopolitical challenges, the articulations crystalize multiple narratives of deep structural and historical legacies while not seriously taken into public debate to be resolved, such as entrenched poverty of urban poor, 1965 genocide, officially minoritization of certain segments of the society (majority versus minority issues relating to freedom of religion and ‘chinese question’). The mainstreaming of communist threat, either PKI or rising power of China, has no geopolitical precendence and repercussion but smokescreen to distract public attention from nation-wide wounds left unresolved. Instead of uniting difference among Islamic forces, Islam in the election incites rampant protest and upheaval in many cities of eastern provinces.
Third, primacy of Islam, as political signifier in the election, is evident for both Pro-Ahok and Anti-Ahok movement. Beyond the apparently collision of conflicting discourses—‘tolerance politics’ versus ‘Islamic populism’, Islam functions as empty signifier to which both parties seek to articulate their electoral interests. The binary of ‘islamic fundamentalism’ versus ‘liberal fundamentalism’ hides their actual maneuvers of taking up religion as political signifier to construct ‘electoral Ummah’. The difference is on their tapping strategies. Anti-Ahok movement exploits Islam by stressing its literal and pious aspects as to mark Ahok and its supporters as both non-Islamic and less Islamic, while Pro-Ahok movement asserts tolerant and peaceful Islam to narrow down the spectrum of hard-line articulation in the opposing camp. One faction attempts at defining Islam for the majority while the other Islam for the minority or celebrating cultural difference. Both strategies of appropriation are performed deliberately to escape real question of substantial democracy, that is, the concrete citizens they claim to represent.
Fourth, another crucial characteristic of Islamic articulation during the election period is the introduction of religious popular movement into political arena. Series of rallying march led by Anti-Ahok faction reflects a shift in ‘Islamic populism’ or ‘conservative turn’. In contrast to Islamic populism of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera in early years of Reform, popular mobilization and participation of various segments of moslem population in the long marches indicate rather new electoral strategy to show popular support as well as to veil the decaying electoral capability of both Islamic and non-Islamic parties. This strategy takes place in the background of public distrust to the parties. In the last few years, Islamic parties have been undergoing public criticism for their rampant corruption and internal conflicts. In seeking electoral victory the only option available is to flirt with the ‘radical-fundamentalist’ groups whose outreach capacity for popular mobilization has been well known including their leaders with provocative oratory eloquence as solidarity makers. Performance of the rallies has been very effective for the political parties to hide behind masses. In short, the self proclaimed label ‘Gerakan Sejuta Umat’ is illustrative of how Islam fills the void in political representation of the political parties and to show strange kind of Indonesian citizenship in Post New Order, the electoral Ummah, whose precedence can be easily detected since presidential election of Jokowi versus Prabowo in 2014.
Concluding Remarks
The overall presentation of our study seeks to show the special function of religion, in this case Islam, as central political signifier in the latest political contest that has sparked greater division than political unity in nationwide spectrum. Centrality of Islam in the contest draws our attention to discrepancy between multicultural trend in civil society and political representation trend in political society. The Ahok case has been the dramaturgy of their intersection in which construction of people or citizen takes place through variety of Islamic articulations. During the process the floating mass is converted into ‘electoral Ummah’, constructed with multiple strategies and tactics of religious articulation in the electoral process and then reconfined into multicultural discourses in next five years. Building on this experience, there is a call for rethinking democratic function of religion that emphasises it universalising tendency instead of particularising tendency. It requires hegemonic project of Islamism that unites broad segments of depolitized population while recognising cultural difference. Contemporary Indonesia is calling for political Islam that promotes pluralist politics, democratic citizenship and competent leadership.
(Frans Djalong. CSPS-UGM. November 2017)
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